Thesis and Antithesis

 In Chapter 3, DVH brings up Hegelian dialectic theory of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.   He stays out of the question of whether this theory is sound from a historical point of view, though he sounds a bit skeptical.  His concern is whether this can be a way of arriving at truth.  

He notes that it's thoroughly possible for thesis and antithesis (as intellectual positions) to both be wrong.  In that case, the middle way of synthesis as a compromise between the two could also be wrong. 

(For the moment, we note but are not primarily concerned with the possibility that the thesis is outright wrong and the antithesis is correct.  For example, "there is no objective truth" is countered by "there is objective truth".  The synthesis between the two positions would also be wrong) 

An example he uses to make the point about all three phases being wrong is that of individualism vs collectivism.   If individual liberty is overstressed in one era, the theory is that community collectivism will be overstressed in the next era, and then we will come to a balancing place between the two.  

"Although the reciprocal extremes seem to be completely antagonistic, they actually share the same crucial error..... the truth lies above the two extremes, not between them." 

In the liberty vs collectivism case, the truth doesn't lie in a compromise between the two.  Both come from a misunderstanding of the deep interrelatedness of humans.   Individualism denies part of the truth of the human being, while collectivism denies the truth of the community.   

"Extremes are not incomplete truths.   Contrary to widespread belief, individualism does not overrate the value and dignity of the human person, nor does collectivism overrate the community.  On the contrary, both actually lose sight of the essence, value, and dignity of the person and the community."

Now, how does this apply to the Vatican II perception?  

"IT is therefore a serious mistake to belittle the grave errors which have crept in among many Catholics by interpreting them as natural reactions to former errors and to console oneself with the anticipation that a resolution of action and reaction will eventually reach the truth in the center."

At this point he doesn't go into detail as to the matter of those grave errors.  Rather he points out that if this hopeful idea of "synthesis" is in error, still more erroneous is the idea of progressives that the reaction, the "antithesis", is the truth itself.

"It is a most absurd form of naivete to proclaim the currently reigning antithesis to errors of a former epoch as a victory of truth and a sign of remarkable progress."

In contrast to this error of absolutizing the views of the present age, the task of the true philosopher is to "free himself from the rhythm of more or less automatic reaction and ascend to the truth which is above all antagonisms between present and former epochs."  

He says that some philosophers today tend to do the exact opposite:  conceptualize and formulate the current trends and tendencies.   This progressive form of philosophy often engenders a kind of smugness about the errors of the past compared to the enlightenment of today.

Now, we turn to a positive statement of the Church's mission and nature.

"The unfolding of the plenitude of divine revelation over the centuries in a movement from the implicit to the explicit is just the opposite of a rhythm of thesis and antithesis which swings from one extreme to another."  

While truth itself can only be unfolded or discovered, not generated by historical trends, the Church besides being the Mystical Body of Christ has an aspect of frail humanity.  Insofar as it is a human institution it too is "exposed to the influence of this alternating rhythm of history."  So here is Newman's thesis that a living organism has to change over time to be perfect.

So far, it seems like we have mostly been establishing the principles for further discussion.   We discarded the false alternatives of "conservative" and "progressive", and dealt with what "renewal" and "reform" mean and do not mean.  Now we are discarding a Hegelian approach to truth in favor of a Catholic model of development of understanding.   One underlying supposition here that we often need to look beyond the terms of the disagreement as stated to find the real thing.  And of course, it's explicit from the first line of the book that DVH thinks that VII is part of the magisterium; so we are talking about the eternal truth as continued by the council, not in opposition to it.

Further Reading:

The Witness of Dietrich von Hildebrand (discusses his view on Hegelian philosophy, among other things)

We can express the greatness of Hildebrand by saying that he freed himself to an extraordinary degree from a perennial German danger. The strong metaphysical impulse of the German, he often said, bears a dubious fruit in the Hegelian philosophy of history, with its idea that a divine “world-spirit” is awakening in the great movements of world history. The German tendency, Hildebrand said, is to think that whatever erupts with dynamic power in history is part of this divine drama or at least has some ultimate significance. Thus one approaches each historic event or movement of thought with awe and is inhibited from ever criticizing it as fundamentally mistaken or disordered....I see it as a great personal and intellectual achievement of Hildebrand’s that he discerned the monstrous evil of Nazism so clearly that the intense historical dynamism of it, though he lived in its midst it and felt it, counted as nothing for him. He did not think with Hegel that history is full of God: He thought with Christianity that history is under the judgment of God. This is why he was able to speak not just as a German professor but also as a Christian confessor.